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Abstract: How do we understand Shakespeare’s invitation to laugh in the context of 
war? Previous critical accounts have offered too simple a view: that laughter 
undercuts military ideals. Instead, this essay draws on the Aristotelian description of 
the laughable ‘deformity’ and Plato’s description of laughable ignorance in order to 
characterize Shakespeare’s laughter in the context of war more carefully as an 
expression of ‘relative painlessness’. It discusses how the fraught amusement of 
Coriolanus (Coriolanus), the reciprocality of Falstaff and Hotspur as laughable 
military failures (1 Henry IV), and the laughter of Bertram at Paroles (All’s Well that 
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Ends Well) each engage with an ancient philosophical conundrum articulated 
poignantly by St Augustine: the requirement that a Christian civilization engage in 
war to defend itself against honour-obsessed aggressors without turning into a like 
aggressor itself. Shakespeare’s laughter at war enacts the desire for that balance.  
 
Keywords: Shakespeare, Christianity, Augustine, laughter, comedy, emotions 
 
An old tension lies at the heart of Christian thinking about war. How does a 
Christian individual, ruler, or state balance the imperative of peace against the 
necessity of engaging in war, with all of its horror? More specifically, how does a 
Christian society balance the need and means for war against a duty not to exult in it 
nor to enjoy constructing an ‘honorable’ selfhood through the destruction of others? 
Shakespeare’s laughter at war, I argue here, addresses that tension.  
Among the theological traditions that influenced thinking about war in 
Shakespeare’s world, there were of course pacifist approaches; however, Augustine’s 
seminal ideas about ‘just war’ were much more commonly adopted.1 For Augustine 
there were exceptions to the commandment, ‘thou shalt not kill’, including the case of 
‘just wars’ waged ‘by God’s authority’.2 It is, he notes (influentially) in De Civitas 
Dei, ‘the iniquity of the opposing side that imposes upon the wise man the duty of 
waging wars’.3 The Roman Empire may have grown, even by means of just wars, 
Augustine admits, and yet that expansion is far from being a kind of felicity:  
Let everyone, therefore, who reflects with pain upon such great evils, 
upon such horror and cruelty, acknowledge that this is misery. And if 
anyone either endures them [wars] or thinks of them without anguish of 
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soul, his condition is still more miserable: for he thinks himself happy 
only because he has lost all human feeling.4  
 
Augustine here registers two levels of war’s pain. Not only are the effects of war a 
great evil but so is the very fact that Christians must sometimes engage in it. The 
fallen world is a tragic world. Soldiers can only address this tension, Augustine 
suggests, by fighting with the aim of creating a larger peace, and with the realization 
that ‘bodily strength is a gift of God’ not to be used ‘against God’.5 From an 
Augustinian perspective, a Christian is never justified in using the opportunity of war 
to exult in the pleasures of self-definition that military ‘honour’ can afford, as 
Shakespeare’s Hotspur, Bertram, Antony, Coriolanus (and family) do, yet must 
bravely engage in war when the need arises, as Shakespeare’s Paroles and Falstaff do 
not.  
Each of those characters can be seen as comic distortions of an ideal Christian 
balance. At the same time, that balance itself has always sat uneasily with the political 
necessity of keeping men on the field, preferring death to ‘dishonor’. Such characters 
– and the amusement Shakespeare generates with them – are partly situated, then, by 
the gap between ancient Christian and ancient Roman discourses of war. Christian 
discourse, and its criticizing laughter, locates a warrior’s proper subjectivity 
somewhere between a Hotspur and a Falstaff, or a Bertram and a Paroles. At the same 
time, a warrior shaped by both Christian and Roman discourses of war is often in a 
position to be deeply attracted at some level both to the valour of a Hotspur or 
Bertram and to the love of bare-life shown by a Falstaff or Paroles. That duality of 
attraction and repulsion, created within the laughter these figures generate (so far as it 
is generated by Shakespeare himself), is a duality difficult to theorize; it goes right to 
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the heart of the differences between Aristotelian and Freudian approaches to laughter. 
Where Freud generally sees ‘the joke’ as an expression of the desire to free up 
repressed aggressive impulses, Aristotle sees ‘the laughable’ as an expression of scorn 
for the ugly.6 Freud explains laughter’s pleasure and Aristotle its proximity to pain. 
Both are important insights that cannot be reconciled easily: we are attracted to the 
laughable and repelled by it.  
The complexity of that attraction-repulsion duality cannot be fully addressed here. 
What I want to do is draw on and develop one particular aspect of the discourse of 
laughter within the Aristotelian tradition in the sixteenth century, an aspect which is 
particularly relevant to laughter in the context of war. It is the idea that a comic space 
creates a kind of emotional distance, a relative painlessness, from that which is 
elsewhere simply troubling or horrifying. Renaissance thinkers often repeat the idea 
that the ridiculus (the laughable) is that type of ‘deformity’ or ‘turpitude’ that is ‘sine 
dolore’ (lacking pain).7 Such ‘emotional distance’ resonates in part with Henri 
Bergson’s famous contention that laughter involves an ‘absence of feeling’, however, 
I think it is unhelpful here to go as far as to call it, with Bergson, ‘a momentary 
anesthesia of the heart’.8 How can ‘the heart’ not be involved in a laughter at war that 
teeters on the edge of its great pain? John Morreall has recently identified within the 
‘comic vision of life’ an ‘emotional disengagement’, as opposed to the engagement 
that tragic visions create.9 The emphasis here, however, will be on the emotional 
‘distance’ of the comic rather than its ‘disengagement’ because I want to locate 
Shakespeare’s laughter at war near the contiguity of the tragic and comic without 
relying too much on those generic categories at the expense of an historical 
philosophy of laughter.   
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In characterizing Shakespeare’s laughter at war as an exploitation of ‘relative 
painlessness’ (sine dolore), I want to avoid two problems. One is the tendency to see 
comical scenes – such as Hotspur’s and Falstaff’s reflections on ‘honour’ in 1 Henry 
IV or the gulling of Paroles in All’s Well that Ends Well – as mere light-hearted and 
ideologically impotent ‘comic relief’.10 Second, I want to avoid conceiving of the 
comical scenes merely as ‘undercutting’ or subverting military ideals, as is often done 
in attempts to politicize laughter: the scenes as much express military ideals, to the 
extent that they encourage laughter at instances where the ideals are deformed. Ros 
King describes how Shakespeare’s characters, including Paroles, apparently subvert 
ideals of conducting war espoused in William Garrard’s The Art of War (1591): ‘in all 
cases’, claims King, ‘Shakespeare comically undercuts the military ideal’.11 Yet the 
question remains: on what basis can we decide whether Shakespeare is using Paroles 
to ‘undercut’ ideals or, rather, encouraging critical laughter at Paroles for failing to 
uphold them in the slightest? Both ‘comic relief’ and ‘undercutting’ are inadequate 
models for analysing how Shakespeare’s laughter at war engages Christian 
philosophical debate about its demands and its horrors: those models do not fully 
address the emotional and moral significance (and complexity) of what is attractive 
and repulsive about his literary individuals.  
An alternative approach is needed. Crisscrossing Europe in the sixteenth century 
was a complex and interrelated set of discourses for discussing laughter and the 
laughable, spanning humanist and medical intellectual circles.12 De Ridiculis, by the 
Italian philosopher Vincenzo Maggi (Vincentius Maddius c.1498-c.1564) is a suitable 
point of entry because it usefully brings together some of the key Aristotelian and 
Platonic concepts being relied on here.13 Maggi first identifies Aristotle’s idea that the 
laughable (ridiculum) is ‘a certain fault or turpitude or deformity without pain (sine 
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dolore)’.14 The classic Aristotelian example is the comic mask: distorted but not in 
pain or causing pain.15 However, Maggi moves immediately to note that it is with 
good reason that Aristotle added the phrase ‘sine dolore’: ‘for if a person sees a face 
distorted from convulsion, they will not be moved to laughter but to pity, unless they 
are inhuman’.16 There is a qualitative emotional difference between pity and laughter, 
to be sure, yet the difference (the relative pain or pleasurable distance) is located for 
Maggi in the relations between amused subject and laughable object. Laughter may 
begin where pain begins to stop but the one who laughs and the one who pities may 
yet be looking at the same face. What is horrible can be intimately related to what is, 
at another remove, laughable. This is particularly relevant to Shakespeare’s laughter 
at war.  
Another fundamentally important consideration is the centrality of laughable 
‘ignorance’. Maggi understands laughable ‘turpitude’ and ‘deformity’ – Latin terms 
derived from Cicero’s glosses on Aristotle’s comments in Poetics – in Platonic terms. 
He sees what is laughable as a kind of deviation from natura, from how things 
‘really’ ought to be. For Maggi, turpitude may be of the body (corporis) or an external 
condition (extrinsecus). The more relevant category here, though, is turpitude or 
deformity of the mind (animi). To explain turpitudo animi, Maggi’s Platonic cast of 
mind draws him to consider varieties of ‘ignorance’. Maggi first notes Plato’s interest 
in different kinds of ignorance in his dialogue Sophist and moves on to consider one 
particularly laughable kind. It occurs in a situation in which ‘we know absolutely 
nothing about the thing we are ignorant of’.17 That situation can be particularly funny 
when it is an ignorance ‘of those things which are commonly known by others [quae 
communiter ab aliis sciuntur] and which are evident from their own natures’.18 Maggi 
gives an example that might be found in many a Roman comedy: ‘if some old guy 
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really believes that it is not indeed his moneybag that the prostitute has fallen in love 
with’.19 The exemplary senex’s magnanimous delusions are a laughable failure of the 
Delphic injunction to know oneself and how things actually are.20 Thus, for Maggi, 
what seems like willful ignorance of what is commonly known and recognized very 
often raises a laugh.  
One potentially laughable aspect of Martius Coriolanus’s attitude to war and 
personal glory, for Shakespeare’s Christian audience, is his complete ignorance of a 
Christian way of seeing war in relation to virtue. Of course, to begin here with 
Coriolanus is not to begin with a particularly funny play, in part precisely because its 
mimetic power is its capacity to create an early Roman world where such an 
Augustinian mode of self-understanding is obviously irrelevant. There is something 
akin to Coriolanus in Hotspur. Yet the scenes with Hotspur in act one scene three of 1 
Henry IV are much funnier than the foreignness of Coriolanus partly perhaps because 
Hotspur’s subjectivity is made to be located more clearly within a quae communiter 
ab aliis sciuntur, a what-is-commonly-understood-by-others.  
In part, the tragic structure of Coriolanus revolves around the hero’s ignorance of 
the delicacy and oratorical skill a patrician leader needs to keep the civitas together. 
That ignorance is connected with his virtually cartoonish commitment to military 
valour for the sake of his own renown. It is not just his career that is at stake. His 
hyperbolic personal valour displaces ordinary incentives for war, such as expansion 
and defense, by making them a secondary concern; and together with his deep 
ignorance of the political arts of civility, such a ‘valour’ eventually threatens the very 
survival of Rome. None of those developments are very funny.  
However, one small scene changes into comic gear and does so without providing 
any ‘relief’. In act one scene three, Volumnia (Martius’s mother), Virgilia (his wife), 
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and Valeria (another Roman lady) discuss Martius – before he comes home to be 
dubbed ‘Coriolanus’ – as well as Martius’s and Virgilia’s young son who has 
‘comically’ shredded a butterfly after toying with it repeatedly.21 I want to suggest 
that our sense that this is a comic scene – even if we do not find it very funny – is 
attributable to the fact that it is structured as a space sine dolore, through the prism of 
the boy, without losing for one moment its empathetic but critical focus on the 
broader culture of war in ancient Rome.  
Even before the comic image of the boy emerges, Volumnia herself highlights the 
‘deformation’ – from an early modern Christian point of view – of her own identity as 
mother, all in the pursuit of an honour stired by ‘renown’ (1.3.11). It is almost but not 
quite disingenuous. Shakespeare is posing the question: is this deformation of 
‘natural’ motherhood funny, disturbing, or something in between? Virgilia expresses 
a natural fear of her husband’s death (1.3.18). Volumnia counters that fear by 
suggesting that in such a scenario she would simply remake her maternal feelings so 
as to be happy with the ‘issue’ of ‘good report’ in place of an actual son (1.3.20-1). 
Now perhaps in a kind of trance, Volumnia exults in a vivid image of her son 
destroying bodies ‘Like to a harvest-man that’s tasked to mow’, wiping the blood off 
his brow as he goes (1.3.38). In response, Virgilia expresses her visceral disgust for 
the blood that signifies the cost of renown: the ruination of other people’s bodies 
(1.3.40). Volumnia counters the emotional power of that blood-signification with a 
grotesque comparison between the ‘loveliness’ of the ‘breasts of Hecuba / When she 
did suckle Hector’ and ‘Hector’s forehead when it spit forth blood / At Grecian 
sword, contemning’ (1.3.42-5). The comically absurd comparison underscores the 
discomfort one might feel toward Volumnia’s economy of renown. It is not perhaps 
accidental that her apparent willingness to exchange one particular life-defining part 
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of herself (a first born son) for another (a ‘good report’) is precisely the kind of 
exchange that Shakespeare’s Falstaff and his Paroles will not make.  
The ladies’ friend Valeria now comes on stage and their reflection on Martius 
continues with reference now to ‘the father’s son’ (1.3.59). Valeria says she saw the 
boy: 
o’ Wednesday…run after a gilded butterfly, and when he caught it, he let 
it go again, and after it again, and over and over…Or whether his fall 
engaged him, or how ’twas, he did so set his teeth and tear it! O, I 
warrant, how he mammocked it!’ (1.3.60-7).  
Volumnia comments: ‘one on’s father’s moods’ (1.3.68). The image of the boy 
involves the same ‘mood’ of absorption and exultation in powerful violence as that of 
the father mowing down bodies. However, boy is associated with father even more 
specifically: through levels of ‘ignorance’, made comic in the image of the boy 
because of its lower stakes, and thus relative emotional distance. The association 
between boy and man is made not merely through their ignorance of (and contempt 
for) the suffering of other beings, butterflies or men. It is also an ignorance of the 
larger ‘purpose’ in violence that a Christian civilization – thinking in Augustinian 
terms – takes for granted. Coriolanus, and the boy who figures him more comically, 
have ‘lost all human feeling’ to use Augustine’s words. The egotistical (and thus more 
broadly pointless) cruelty toward the butterfly renders (sine dolore) Coriolanus’s own 
self-absorbed cruelty both to his country and ultimately to himself. Coriolanus’s 
valour serves a ‘renown’ that he cannot even protect precisely because he is ignorant 
of the political arts of civility. That ignorance comes to a tragic and immensely 
moving end in the final confrontation scene of act five scene three. Volumnia finally 
persuades her son to desist from his attack on Rome partly by pointing out that his 
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total self-absorption in personal valour, expressed as revenge, will actually bring 
about its own self-denial through a notoriety for having destroying his own country. 
The scene is anything but funny, though its stakes are prefigured in the comic image 
of the boy who will grow up to be the same kind of threat. Intriguingly, Coriolanus, 
finally moved by his mother, immediately observes: ‘the heavens do ope, / The gods 
look down, and this unnatural scene / They laugh at’ (5.3.184-86). Of course, the gods 
have the benefit of further remove.  
One might link Coriolanus’s ignorance to the more laughable ignorance of Hotspur 
by means of an intriguing observation of Enobarbus in Antony and Cleopatra. At the 
end of act three, Enobarbus, fearing the many consequences of his master Antony’s 
waning star, has decided to ‘seek some way to leave him’ (3.13.202-3). Enobarbus 
states his reason: ‘I see still / A diminution in our captain’s brain / Restores his heart’ 
(3.13.199-201). By way of further explanation, he describes Antony’s attitude to war 
such that it is characterized as just such a distortion of Augustine’s Christian balance, 
a distortion which has been seen in Coriolanus and shall be in Hotspur: ‘When valour 
preys on reason, / It eats the sword it fights with’ (3.13.201-2). That is to say, valour 
can absorb a person to the point of ignoring the very understanding that would 
preserve it, which everyone else can see. Thus it rusts itself. Unaccountable valour 
deconstructs its own meaning. This is a failure of the Delphic injunction ‘know 
thyself’, a state of ignorance that might be rendered tragic, comical, or tragi-comical, 
depending on the pain it causes. 
Hotspur is a case in point. As Roberta Barker has shown, he has been read as tragic 
hero and comical fool, and can be read as both simultaneously.22 In a much discussed 
scene of 1 Henry IV, act one scene three, Hotspur, angry at having to give up his 
prisoners to King Henry, incoherently expresses both his rage at Henry’s former 
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courtesy now turned to cold regality and his fantasies about leaping ‘To pluck bright 
honour from the pale-faced moon’ (1.3.200) or diving to the bottom of the sea to 
‘pluck up drownèd honour by the locks’ (1.3.203). His overblown apprehensions are 
the more funny because they are spoken in clear ignorance of the fact that his uncle 
and father are patiently waiting to discuss ‘matter deep and dangerous’ (1.3.188), 
things which will actually answer to the younger man’s perturbations. Alexander 
Leggatt points out the absurdity of Hotspur’s unconscious self-criticism in these lines, 
for ‘an honour that has to be fetched from the moon or the depths of the sea is an 
honour that is lost’.23 Audiences have also no doubt laughed for centuries at Hotspur’s 
puerile fantasy of tormenting King Henry – vexed already with Mortimer’s claim to 
the throne – by yelling ‘Mortimer!’ (1.3.221) in the sleeping king’s ear or by teaching 
a starling to speak nothing but that name ‘To keep his anger still in motion’ (1.3.224).  
These are what Vincenzo Maggi would have called ‘laughable deformities’ of the 
norms of the adult male sapiens.  
However, there are levels of ignorance, too, that should be added. It is not just that 
Shakespeare’s Hotspur (so far as he is comical) ignores his father and his uncle or that 
he embodies an ignorance of the outdatedness of chivalric honour codes. It is also that 
he ignores (in so far as he is both comical and tragical) the ‘form of what he should 
attend’ (1.3.208), which is the fact that if he is going to survive politically, and 
establish the honour he desires, he must attend to the kind of policy that his uncle 
Worcester is trying to propose. This is a comical ignorance of quae communiter ab 
aliis sciuntur, a what-is-commonly-understood-by-others, glimpsed tellingly in his 
speedy and narrow gloss on Worcester’s machinations as a ‘noble plot’ (1.3.273).  
While Shakespeare makes something of the same ignorance a part of Hotspur’s 
downfall in the later acts of the play, it remains comic here because of the framing 
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that renders it sine dolore. Later on, Hotspur’s self-declared inability to ‘flatter’ and 
his defiance of ‘the tongues of soothers’ (4.1.6-7) means that he cannot distinguish 
when to use those arts and when to use the force of arms. His enthusiasm for the self-
definition offered by the use of arms emerges in his reading of his father’s absence as 
a ‘lustre’ (4.1.77) to be derived rather than the military disadvantage that most others 
see. The myopia is underscored later by Vernon (4.3.20). At this level, he is 
comparable with Coriolanus. However, act one scene three remains on the comic side 
of the spectrum because of the safety built into it. Although Hotspur is, as his father 
puts it, ‘drunk with choler’ (1.3.127), there is no real fear that he will ‘hazard’ 
(1.3.126) his head by going after the king to refuse the return of the demanded 
prisoners. In addition, responding to Hotspur’s assurance that his rant is over, ‘I have 
done’ (1.3.252), Worcester’s bemused mockery – ‘Nay, if you have not, to’t again. / 
We’ll stay your leisure’ (1.3.253-54) – signals that the scene is moving toward an 
expense of spirit rather than any climactic (and dangerous) confrontation. And yet it is 
the same ‘deformity’.  
E.M.W. Tillyard influentially characterized Hotspur as ‘honour exaggerated’, an 
‘excess’ of ‘military spirit’, contrasting him with Falstaff’s military ‘defect’, 
‘dishonour’.24 However, Falstaff’s famous reflection on ‘honour’ – ‘Can honour set to 
a leg? No. Or an arm? No. Or take away the grief of a wound? No. Honour hath no 
skill in surgery, then? No. What is honour? A word…Therefore, I’ll none of it. 
Honour is a mere scutcheon. And so ends my catechism’ (5.1.131-40) – is often 
regarded sympathetically as a part of Shakespeare’s questioning of chivalry and the 
honour code rather than as a comic distortion that expresses its ideals. As Quabeck 
notes, the sympathy is plausible partly because ‘Falstaff rises after Hal’s exit and 
triumphs over the dead honourable knight [Hostpur]’ and so his parodic ‘catechism on 
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the uselessness of honour seems to be confirmed as the more reasonable approach’.25 
Furthermore, his disreputable behaviour as a warrior – not only by misusing ‘the 
King’s press damnably’ (4.2.13) but also by stabbing an already dead Hotspur in the 
leg (5.4.126-27) – seems to be a part of Shakespeare’s questioning of the honour code 
Hostpur stands for: it has been overtaken by a living embodiment of the refusal to 
condone its meanings and priorities. Quabeck suggests that what is going on here is 
that if Shakespeare is expressing ‘disillusionment with chivalry’ as James Shapiro and 
Thomas Merriam have debated, he is not, however, therefore disillusioned with ‘just 
conduct’ in war.26 Military values tied up with jus in bello (right conduct in war) have 
not in some simple way been ‘undercut’.  
There are a range of laughable deformities displayed in the honour speech that 
might have amused audiences across the centuries about Falstaff and his ‘catechism’. 
These, too, are structured in a way that keeps audiences a step or two from pain, from 
dolore. Falstaff deforms, laughably, the virtue of bravery in a Christian kingdom by 
rationalizing his own cowardice in a manner that parodies not only a ‘catechism’ but 
perhaps also a scene from book XI of the Iliad in which Odysseus convinces himself 
successfully to stand firm on the side of honour against the impulse to survive, as 
Steven Doloff has suggested.27 Christopher McDonough has argued that Falstaff’s 
reference to honour as ‘a mere scutcheon’ – actually a piece of ‘armament’ itself and 
not just a ‘decorative device’ – situates him ‘squarely in the classical motif of the 
rhipsaspis or “shield-tosser”’, a pathetic, if empathetic, scenario in which the soldier 
gives in to ‘the instinct for self-preservation’ despite its shame.28 Much of the ‘honour 
speech’ is funny – to the extent that an audience wishes to see Falstaff in terms of 
such laughable ‘deformity’ – because it is sine dolore: Falstaff’s equivocations are 
only a moderate threat to his captain’s enterprise. Indeed Shakespeare does not 
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position the outcome of the battle by making it a result of who has the right kind of 
honour. Hal simply beats Hotspur. Hal’s political acumen does not help him, nor does 
Hotspur’s exulted selfhood, when arm meets arm. The battle itself seems less about 
who has the winning attitude to war and more about what the right attitude to war 
itself should be.  
Rather than decide who of Hostpur and Falstaff is the more disreputed, (and 
disreputable) or who is the more human character and who the more comic, I wish to 
pose them as ‘contraries’ of a particular kind, contraries that deepen Shakespeare’s 
laughter at war.29 Whereas Tillyard’s purpose in contrasting Hotspur and Falstaff as 
comic distortions was to bring out Prince Hal as the real hero of military virtue – an 
Aristotelian ‘middle quality between two extremes’ – my purpose is to show how the 
ideal Christian ethical balance in a soldier’s attitude to war emerges in their midst, 
rather than simply Hal as a specific embodiment of balance.30 It is a middle ground 
distanced from both extremes of exultation and dishonour, yet is constituted in the 
reciprocity of their laughability, making them ‘contraries’ of a unique kind.  
It is not the ‘contrariety’ that Robert Weimann and Douglas Bruster link with 
clowning, where a clown embodies the heterogeneity especially of author’s pen 
embodied in actor’s voice.31 Weimann and Bruster refer to the ‘discourse of the 
contrarious’ in the period as they develop their account of clowning, in which 
contrariety on stage is seen as a sort of ‘transport’ between author and actor.32 In 
making that claim, they quote from Sidney’s Apology for Poetry, especially his 
understanding of the contrariety between ‘laughter’ and ‘delight’.33 Weimann and 
Bruster see in this Sidnean difference the contrariety they theorize in the ‘transport’ 
between clowning’s embodied unpredictability and author’s written word: that is to 
say, unscripted ‘laughter’ threatens with unpredictability – they read Sidney as saying 
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– the proper bounds of decorous comedy, which ought to produce ‘delight’. That may 
be so. However, Sidney goes on immediately to explain the difference between the 
two emotional responses, of delight and laughter, in a way that introduces another 
kind of contrariety relevant to this discussion. Sidney says: ‘for delight we scarcely do 
but in things that have a conveniency to ourselves or the general nature; laughter 
almost ever cometh of things disproportioned to ourselves and nature.’34 To laugh at 
something, Sidney suggests, is to respond to something contrary, or disproportioned, 
to one’s own ideals. To delight in something is rather the opposite.  
Though Sidney keeps those orientations, laughter and delight, fundamentally 
separate, he inadvertently gives us a means of thinking about the contrariness of 
Hostpur and Falstaff, in relation to Augustine’s conception of a properly balanced 
approach to Christian war. At one level, Shakespeare has made Hotspur and Falstaff 
contraries because each is a laughable deformity of one particular side of the Christian 
balance: Hotspur of too much military exultation, and Falstaff of cowardice and self-
regard. However, a further aspect must be observed. In each of the two characters, 
what the Christian military subject of Shakespeare’s audience may laugh at as being 
‘disproportioned’ to himself and ‘nature’, is an expression of the same perspective 
that lends a delighting ‘conveniency’ to the other character – using Sidney’s terms. In 
other words, what is laughably deformed about Falstaff is informed by the humanity 
and virtuous nobility of Hotspur. Likewise, what is laughably deformed about 
Hotspur is informed by the humanity and critical acumen of Falstaff. Each one’s 
particular insight into the ideal Augustinian-Christian balance is an insight directly 
linked to the laughable deformity of the other. Laughter at and delight in these 
characters cross over rather than just coincide. The clever balance of repulsion and 
attraction in effect forges a middle space. Shakespeare invites laughter in both 
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directions so as to create a middle ground that resonates with a balanced Christian 
view of war as necessary but thoroughly repulsive, and thus tragic. Shakespeare’s 
laughter at war engages a Christian philosophy of war, not just particular ‘values’ of 
chivalry, honour, bravery, et cetera.  
In All’s Well that Ends Well, Shakespeare refigures that crisscrossing laughter at-
and-with Hotspur-Falstaff, with their contrary military failures. This happens via his 
clever pairing of Bertram and Paroles, in the interlinked scenes of act three and four. 
Through that pairing, Shakespeare makes Bertram himself the point of focus for 
considering the ideal Augustinian middle ground. Helen Wilcox has pointed out that 
integral to the play’s ‘tragi-comedy of war’ is the fact that Shakespeare ‘leaves us 
unsure of the grounds’ for its particular conflict: the effect is that the ideals of 
‘soldierly honour’ ‘are firmly cast in the past’.35 For Wilcox, Shakespeare makes an 
‘unflinching mockery’ of the ‘whole world of war’ in the play, a mockery heavily 
dependent on the interpenetrating ‘languages of war and sexual desire’.36 In this play, 
laughter at Paroles and his failure to uphold military ideals is interlinked with Bertram 
in a different manner from that we have seen, for Bertram is not a Hotspur in the same 
way that Paroles is like to Falstaff. Bertram’s shocked laughter at Paroles’ becomes 
an potential agent in his own self-realisation, in so far as it invites him toward a more 
balanced approach to war via the legitimate claims of the social.  
The pairing of Bertram and Paroles is central to that dynamic. As Robert Miola has 
shown convincingly, the two are ‘moral identical twins’, two sides of the same coin 
not least because they split the Roman miles gloriosus (braggart soldier) figure into 
two halves: Bertram embodies his ‘amorous pretensions’ while Paroles does his 
‘military’ ones.37 There are many other parallels spanning the two characters and the 
ordeals they face in the play. Most obviously, Shakespeare interlinks the scenes in 
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which Bertram is caught by Helen’s bed trick and Paroles is caught by Bertram’s 
men. The ‘smoking’ (shaming and exposure) of Paroles prefigures that of Bertram in 
the play’s final act.38 Also, at the beginning of act four scene three, with the plot to 
expose Paroles in place, the first and second Lords Dumaine discuss the despicable 
behaviour of Bertram while they wait for him to return in order to follow through with 
the plot against Paroles. First they make abstract observations about human 
imperfection and ignorance with Bertram in mind: the second lord, for instance, says 
that we are ‘merely our own traitors’ and, with reference to Bertram that, ‘he 
contrives against his own nobility’ (4.3.22, 25-6). A few lines down, the first lord 
wishes explicitly that in the gulling to come Bertram ‘might take a measure of his 
own judgments’ (4.3.34) to which the second lord responds with: ‘We will not meddle 
with him till he come, for his presence must be the whip of the other’ (4.3.36-8). If the 
proliferation of ambiguous pronouns here is deliberate, the effect is to jam the 
references to Bertram and Paroles together and emphasize the mutuality of the 
coming comedy that will ‘meddle’ and ‘whip’.   
The pairing clearly associates the comic shaming of Paroles with the (possibly 
comic) shaming of Bertram. Miola suggests that the ‘daring strategy’ of making ‘a 
comic butt’ into a ‘romantic lead is not without risks, as the history of dissatisfaction 
with Bertram for failing to be a Romeo…shows’.39 Yet Paroles’ laughable faults are 
clear enough. Under pressure, he willfully ignores his ‘friends’, such as they are – 
though, of course, this is the sort of conflict in which, as the French king says, the 
young men ‘freely…have leave / To stand on either part’ (1.2.14-15). Like Falstaff, 
Paroles is also obviously a coward. In accordance with an ideal ‘Drumme’ – a 
vulnerable military position involving the use of a drum to communicate commands 
and good linguistic skills to parley with the enemy side – Paroles ‘has a smack of all 
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neighbouring languages’ (4.1.16).40 Yet, contrary to the Drum’s responsibility not to 
‘bewray any secrets known’ if caught by the enemy, Paroles is immediately willing to 
use any of the languages he knows to do just that once he believes he is caught 
(4.1.72-74).41 At the same time, though, and again like Falstaff, he is in tune with a 
certain kind of realism that the exultation of war, in its turn, ignores: ‘Simply the 
thing I am / Shall make me live’ (4.3.334-35). Just like the fat knight, this gives him 
an attraction parallel to his laughable deformity.  
Bertram’s ignorance of Paroles and, by extension, of himself is the primary 
structure through which Paroles’ comic shaming is made to reflect back on Bertram. 
In both cases, what is ridiculous about them is structured cleverly within quae 
communiter ab aliis sciuntur, what-is-commonly-understood-by-others. As Bertram’s 
fog of ignorance about Paroles clears, so begins the slower clearing of his foggy 
relationships with others. Accordingly, his manner of referring to Paroles softens 
slightly from ‘What a past-saving slave is this!’ (4.3.143) to ‘I could endure anything 
before but a cat, and now he’s a cat to me’ (4.3.242-43). The reflexivity of ‘he’s a cat 
to me’ is also a step along from the earlier confidence of ‘He can say nothing of me’ 
(4.3.119-20) and recalls the lord Dumaine’s comment mentioned before (4.3.36-8) 
about the one half of Bertram-Paroles whipping the other. Bertram recognizes in 
Paroles a laughable ignorance of the underpinning responsibilities of the social bonds, 
which construct Paroles’ identity. As that happens, Bertram himself is presented with 
the possibility of seeing – through his laughter at Paroles’ distasteful ignorance and 
military infidelity – his own infidelity in love and his own ignorance of the 
possibilities created by familial and social bonds. The semantic duality of ‘honour’ in 
reference to sex and war here is key. Bertram’s mother wants him to be informed that 
‘his sword can never win / The honour that he loses’ (3.2.95-6). Miola describes the 
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link clearly: ‘The word “honour” suggests the military standard Bertram upholds and 
the amorous one he violates, unmarking and marking him as a comic butt like 
Paroles.’42 This is precisely why, ‘the love of war and the war of love’ that Wilcox 
documents, ‘are interlinked in the play’.43 Military ignorance figures amatory 
ignorance and thus one kind of laughable ignorance (Paroles) is meant to illuminate 
and expose the other (Bertram). Whether or not illumination actually happens – one 
can play Bertram in different ways after all – the invitation for Bertram to see himself 
anew, through the prism of Paroles’ laughability, is there. It is an invitation to see the 
relationship between his military and his erotic self-hood in a more balanced 
relationship with claims of family and society, which underpin who he is. To see 
himself in that way would be to step outside the very ignorance that links him with 
Coriolanus as a distortion of the Augustinian approach to war.  
Looking, with a laugh, at the prism of Paroles’ deformed ignorance is plausibly 
much funnier to Bertram than looking through that prism to glimpse himself. This is 
because the former vision is relatively sine dolore. In the final act, the emotional 
distance of laughing at Paroles falls away and Bertram is forced even further by 
others to confront his own uncomfortable reality. Just as Shakespeare links laughter at 
Paroles with an invitation to Bertram to balance out the meaning of his own military 
selfhood, so he invites the Christian subject within his audiences toward a balanced 
view of war.  
I have argued that Shakespeare’s laughter at war evokes and responds to the 
difficulty faced by Christian societies that must at the same time engage in war – and 
keep men on the field – without eating the ‘swords’ they fight with by culturally 
endorsing military exultation. The laughter at Coriolanus, the laughter in-between 
Hotspur and Falstaff, and the laughter of Bertram at Paroles each generate and work 
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(rhetorically) to intensify the desire for balance proposed by Augustine. They 
normalize balance and intensify desire for it by means of the interlocking forces 
arranged between the characters of laughing at, laughing with, and, perhaps, laughing 
from.  
Shakespeare’s means of doing this involves different modes of constructing a 
laughter of ‘relative painlessness’, distanced from the painful and tragic reality of 
war, though in no way the less focused on its imbalances for being sine dolore. 
Shakespeare maintains a relative painlessness in his laughter at war in several ways. 
He displaces pain at shredded human bodies by refocusing, for instance, on the image 
of mammocked butterflies instead, and yet he keeps laughter on the verge of pain by 
focusing, too, on laughable ignorance that is sometimes close to military consequence 
(Falstaff misusing the king’s press) and sometimes less so (Paroles losing the drum).  
Furthermore, a laughter of relative painlessness in the context of war also 
implicitly frames itself within the larger consolations of Augustinian theology. The 
ending of the ‘comedy’ All’s Well That Ends Well is unsatisfactory perhaps precisely 
because it leaves us merely with hope, rather than assurance, that harmony, 
forgiveness, and expanded vision will follow on from the uncomfortable 
confrontation. Augustine finishes De Civitas Dei with just the same inarticulate hope 
for comoedia divina. Writing ‘Of the eternal felicity of the City of God’, in which 
‘there will be no evil’ and ‘no good thing will be lacking’, he admits ‘I cannot even 
imagine it’; though of course he is without any doubt that it will come.44 This is a 
thirst for the transformation of the cosmos, away from the sound and fury of perpetual 
war, that tale told by idiots, away from the tragic signification of nothing and toward 
the ending of a comedy, in which ‘we will neither cease from work through idleness 
nor be driven to it by need’.45 Shakespeare’s laughter at war, as it looks backward, is 
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like Hamlet’s jesting with death in the graveyard: a jesting without which we human 
beings could not ‘face the truth of our absurdity’.46 His laughter within war, as it 
looks forward with theological vision, is like to the desire for a good ‘end’ to the 
comedy.  
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